Ginsburg's dissent is, to me, a far more persuasive and compelling set of arguments than those promulgated by the majority in the Hobby Lobby case.  The crux of Ginsburg's argument is a point that the majority, as far as I can tell, basically ignored:

Importantly, the decisions whether to claim benefits under the plans are made not by Hobby Lobby or Conestoga, but by the covered employees and dependents, in consultation with their health care providers.  Should an employee of Hobby Lobby or Conestoga share the religious beliefs of the Greens and Hahns, she is of course under no compulsion to use the contraceptives in question.  But “[n]o individual decision by an employee and her physician—be it to use contraception, treat an infection, or have a hip replaced--is in any meaningful sense [her employer’s] decision or action.”  Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F. 3d 850, 865 (CA7 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting).  It is doubtful that Congress, when it specified that burdens must be "substantial," had in mind a linkage thus interrupted by independent decisionmakers (the woman and her health counselor) standing between the challenged government action and the religious exercise claimed to be infringed.  Any decision to use contraceptives made by a woman covered under Hobby Lobby’s or Conestoga’s plan will not be propelled by the Government, it will be the woman’s autonomous choice, informed by the physician she consults.

The majority on the Court does not seem to comprehend how this part of the ACA was supposed to enhance the autonomy of women.